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Having sufficient fiscal capacity to tax is a key hallmark and defining feature of states, and
there is a growing literature trying to explain its origins. Existing empirical evidence on fiscal
capacity is scarce and focuses on large, ex-post successful territories. In this paper we study
the introduction of the first centralized, permanent fiscal institutions in the multifarious territo-
ries of the Holy Roman Empire from 1400 to 1800. We link information on fiscal centralization
and the size and survival of territories to an extensive dataset on state-formation and growth-
related outcomes. We empirically confirm that territories are more likely to centralize when
neighboring territories are centralized and when they are exposed to a higher threat of war. In
line with the literature on the consequences of fiscal capacity, we show that centralized terri-
tories are more likely to survive than non-centralized territories and as a result grow more in
size. They invest more in administrative andmilitary structures, but investments in themilitary
only occur in the core areas of centralized territories. This contradicts the central assumption of
models on fiscal capacity which states that investments into the military are a non-excludable
public good.
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The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history.
Schumpeter (1918)
1 Introduction
The idea that “nothing is certain but death and taxes” would have surprised a person living in the
Middle Ages. While death was of course certain, taxes were either non-existent or irregular. Today,
on the other hand, taxation by sovereign states is taken for granted in most parts of the world.
However, there are large differences in the ability of governments to levy and collect taxes as it
for example becomes apparent when looking at the size of the shadow economy relative to overall
GDP in different countries: in Switzerland the shadow economy is estimated to make up 7 percent
of GDP, whereas in Georgia around 65 percent (Medina and Schneider, 2018). These differences
have far-reaching consequences for the ability of states to provide government spending, social
services, or growth-enhancing investments. It is thus not surprising that most accounts of the rise
of the modern state, from Schumpeter (1918) and Weber (1919) to Tilly (1975) and Olson (1993),
identify the emergence of taxation as the key hallmark and defining feature of the state.
Even though the introduction of permanent and stable fiscal administrations is one of the most
striking changes in the relationship between states and their citizens, and there is no scarcity of
theories explaining this crucial transition to modernity, we lack consistent and reliable empirical
evidence on the circumstances and consequences of the development of fiscal capacity. Historical
data on tax revenues or tax-collecting institutions are scarce, and in most cases do not extend
back to the date of their introduction. In fact, the very emergence of modern statistics is clearly a
consequence, not a precondition for the emergence of fiscal capacity (Woolf, 1989).1
In this paper, we use the rich history of the Holy Roman Empire to study a range of economic
and institutional developments arguably linked to the introduction of modern fiscal administra-
tions. Between the 16th and the 18th century, several component territories of the Holy Roman
Empire introduced permanent offices, staffed by professionally trained individuals, in charge of
raising and organizing revenues, and replacing personalized, local, or ad-hoc systems of taxation.
These offices, mostly called “Chambers” (Hofkammer or Rentkammer), substantially increased the
ability of sovereigns to raise taxes and thus to increase military power or provide public goods.2
The outcomes we study cover both the periods before the introduction of fiscal institutions — thus
allowing us to test theories relating to the emergence of fiscal capacity — and after their intro-
duction — thus shedding light on the political and economic consequences of this momentous
transition.
1An alternative approach to investigate the origins of state formation and taxation is to study contemporary weakly
institutionalized environments and their development in reaction to external shocks, as in Sa´nchez de la Sierra (2019).
2Formost if not all territories of that time, raising sovereign debt was not a feasible path to increase state revenue, due
to unsurmountable commitment problems (North and Weingast, 1989; Drelichman and Voth, 2014). Arguably, access to
credit was easier for city states (Stasavage, 2011).
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Our contribution is fourfold. First, we document and date of development of centralized fis-
cal institutions (“fiscal centralization”) for 27 territories of the Holy Roman Empire in the period
between the 16th and the 18th century. The Holy Roman Empire, a loose confederation of hun-
dreds of largely sovereign states of varying size, provides an ideal setting in which to study the
genesis and consequences of this institutional innovation for eventually successful and eventually
unsuccessful states. The detailed nature of our historical data allow us to observe all major territo-
ries – kingdoms, prince-bishoprics, dukedoms, margraviates, and principalities of all kinds — at
a yearly level. We can thereby overcome selection (suvivorship) bias. In contrast to existing lit-
erature that focuses on few, ex-post successful territories such as Prussia or England, we consider
all territories that existed and not just those that survived and eventually became large.3 To un-
derstand the mechanisms that explain fiscal capacity and its effects, we need to understand which
territories do not survive, and why.
Second, we map the cities in our dataset to a rich set of state formation and growth-related
outcomes for the Holy Roman Empire. Our data are based on the city histories contained in
the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch (Keyser et al., eds, 1939-2003), a detailed encyclopedia of all 2,392 places
within Germany according to its borders in 1937 that were granted, at some point, city rights.4
In particular, we can first measure a variety of outcomes relating to historical territories as our
unit of observation: we observe dynastic mergers, break-ups, territorial expansions or losses as a
consequence of wars and treaties. More generally, we can trace the existence, size, and shape of
a territory through the number of cities a territory controls. Our second set of outcomes are all
major construction events listed for any given city in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch: these can be clas-
sified into different types of buildings (military, administrative, public infrastructures. . . ) and are
dated precisely at the city-year level.5 Construction data give us an insight into administrative and
military investments, and are ultimately a proxy for economic (urban) growth. We can also mea-
sure a territory’s exposure to war through the prism of the recorded history – occupations, sieges,
destruction – of the cities that belong to it, again as reported in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
Third, we investigate the circumstances under which territories have adopted the institutions
of fiscal centralization. We are able to confirm a number of hypotheses that have been put forward
in the theoretical literature on the origins of fiscal capacity: territories are more likely to central-
ize when neighboring territories are centralized, and when they are exposed to a more bellicose
environment.
3Tilly (1975) points out this fundamental selection problem: “Most of the European efforts to build states failed. The
enormous majority of the political units which were around to bid for autonomy and strength in 1500 disappeared in the next few
centuries, smashed or absorbed by other states-in-the-making [. . . ] [O]f the handful which survived or emerged into the nineteenth
century as autonomous states, only a few operated effectively–regardless of what criterion of effectiveness we employ. The dispro-
portionate distribution of success and failure puts us in the unpleasant situation of dealing with an experience in which most of the
cases are negative, while only the positive cases are well-documented” (p. 38-39).
4Weuse the anachronism “Germany” throughout the paper to refer to the German-speaking lands of theHoly Roman
Empire. The cities included in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch encompass Germany in the borders of 1937.
5These data have been used previously in Cantoni et al. (2018).
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Fourth, we look at the consequences of fiscal centralization. Observing territory-related out-
comes, we find that centralized territories are more likely to survive, and grow more (expand the
number of cities that they control6) than non-centralized territories. Observing city-related out-
comes, we find that cities belonging to centralized territories invest more in administrative and
military construction. This is predicted by models of fiscal centralization. But we also find evi-
dence that is contrary to one of the core assumptions in the formal literature on fiscal capacity. In
theoretical frameworks citizens accept fiscal institutions and taxes because they expect revenues to
be used for military investments, which will protect them. These investments are always modeled
in the form of non-excludable public goods. Despite this, we find that increases in military invest-
ments only occur in the core of territories, and not in the periphery. Factually, some citizens were
thus excluded from these investments, and they can thus not be thought of as public goods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we survey the existing literature
on fiscal capacity, and derive testable hypotheses that we will empirically test. Section 3 discusses
the historical background of fiscal capacity in the Holy Roman Empire, and section 4 explains our
dataset. We first look at potential determinants of fiscal capacity in section 5, before turning to the
effects of fiscal capacity in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature and Hypotheses
2.1 Definitions
State capacity and fiscal capacity are central concepts in the analysis of state formation. State ca-
pacity can broadly be defined as a “state’s ability to implement a range of policies” (Besley and
Persson, 2010, p.1), or “the ability of a state to collect taxes, enforce law and order, and provide
public goods” (Johnson and Koyama, 2017, p. 2). Often, states are described according to their
ability to enforce policies as either “weak” or “strong”. In some cases the term state capacity does
not refer to this broad definition, but to a concept mostly termed fiscal capacity in the economics
literature.7 Fiscal capacity “captures how much tax a government could potentially raise given
the structure of the tax system and its available power of enforcement” (Besley and Persson, 2013,
p. 52). Sufficient levels of fiscal capacity allow states to collect enough taxes to finance their poli-
cies (Johnson and Koyama, 2017, p. 2). Empirical work has used several observable measures or
proxies for fiscal capacity. Dincecco (2009, p. 52) uses a binary variable measuring whether a coun-
try is fiscally centralized, where fiscal centralization “was completed the year that the national
government began to secure revenues using a tax system with uniform tax rates throughout the
6We can also look at the area a territory controls, and find the same relationship using this measure.
7The usage of the term state capacity to refer to what is mostly termed fiscal capacity in the economics literature is
in line with how Tilly (1975) originally used the term. In this paper state capacity refers to the broad definition listed
above, and we use the term fiscal capacity to talk about the capacity to tax in particular.
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country”.8 Besley and Persson (2011) turn to per capita tax returns as a measure of the degree of
fiscal capacity.
Fiscal and state capacity are also relevant for the literature on the importance of institutions
for economic growth. Much influential work has defined institutions along the lines of “legal
capacity”, the ability to support markets (Besley and Persson, 2010, p.1) and the ability to enforce
rules across the entirety of the territory a government claims to rule (Johnson and Koyama, 2017,
p. 2). North (1981), for example, measures the strength of states in early modern Europe by their
ability to enforce property rights. Acemoglu et al. (2001) consider the risk of expropriation and
repudiation of government contracts. Some work on fiscal capacity also studies interactions with
legal capacity (e.g. in Besley and Persson, 2009). Looking at an earlier era, the granting of city
rights by territorial lords can also be seen as an instance of building of state capacity (Cantoni and
Yuchtman, 2014).
2.2 Determinants of Fiscal Capacity
Attempts to explain the emergence of state capacity as a driver of state formation go back at least
as far as Weber (1919). Weber defined the state in terms of its monopoly on legitimate violence
over a defined geographical area. A large literature (see for example Brewer, 1990; Levi, 1989)
has tried to explain how states managed to establish this monopoly. One of the most influential
arguments on state formation was made by Charles Tilly (1975), and has often been epitomized in
the quote “[w]ar made the state and the state made war” (p. 42). Fighting war was costly, and thus
rulers had to extract money from their population to finance these wars. As losing war was costly
to everyone (e.g. if cities were looted), the population supported higher military investments and
was willing to contribute to finance these. To organize the collection of taxes, fiscal bureaucracies
were established. Once some states had built up such institutions, their neighboring states had to
build up these fiscal capacity themselves to be able to compete with them or they would vanish
(see for example Tilly, 1975; Bean, 1973).9 This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Buildup of fiscal capacity in neighboring territories increases the probability that a territory
will establish modern fiscal institutions.
Tilly’s argument that war drives the buildup of fiscal capacity is at the core of many theoretical
models on fiscal and state capacity in the economics literature.10 Military spending as a reaction
8Specifically, for the case of the region considered in this paper, Dincecco dates fiscal centralization only for the
Kingdom of Prussia, selecting 1806 — the year in which the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, modernizing the entire Prussian
government, were enacted — as the relevant date. Our empirical analysis focuses on the dates in which these fiscal
institutions were first established, not the year of completion of the process.
9For a more detailed summary of the argument that war led to fiscal capacity and this led to state foundation in
Europe refer to Herbst (1990, p. 117-122). In broader context, this is related to the study of spatial patterns of adoption
of policy innovations, see e.g. Mukand and Rodrik (2005), Dobbin et al. (2007), and Cantoni (2012).
10Other potential determinants of fiscal capacity that are discussed in the literature are political stability, protection
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to a threat of war enters models as a public good. While economists argue that there could also be
other public goods that drive the build-up of fiscal capacity, they usually discuss military invest-
ments as the only example of a common-interest public good (see for example Besley and Persson,
2009). Besley et al. (2013) extend these considerations to a dynamic framework looking at the evo-
lution of fiscal capacity over time, again focussing on the demand for public goods, i.e. military
investments, as a potential driver of fiscal centralization.11 A higher demand for the public good
translates into more investments into fiscal capacity.
The link between war and fiscal centralization has been refined in several ways. Some authors
distinguish between external and internal wars (Besley and Persson, 2008, 2010; Dincecco and
Wang, 2018). While the threat of external war generates a common demand for military invest-
ments across the entire population, threat of internal war generates conflicting interests among the
population. These models predict that as a result, the threat of external war leads to higher levels
and threat of civil war leads to lower levels of fiscal capacity. Ko et al. (2018) examine how the
number and geographic origins of external threats affect state-building. In their model military
strength decreases with distance to the capital city. They argue that, as European territories faced
external threats from different directions, it was optimal to have several (smaller) states instead of
a centralized European empire. This allowed each state to tax its population and use tax incomes
to provide military investments in a capital that was as close as possible to the external threat it
was facing. Queralt (2018) distinguishes howwar was financed in the modern period (from 1817 to
1913): while tax-financed wars have a positive impact on fiscal capacity, loan-financed wars do not
always lead to an increase in fiscal capacity. Karaman and Pamuk (2013) look at twelve European
territories from the 16th to the 18th century to test the role of warfare, economic structure, and
political regime for the development of fiscal and state capacity. They find that war and modern
urbanized economic structures increase tax revenues. Political regimes interact with these factors
as representative regimes were more successful at building state capacity in urbanized economies,
whereas authoritarian regimes fared better in less urbanized settings.
Gennaioli and Voth (2015) examine the changing role of money for military success over time.
Available financial resources only begin to matter for war success after the so-called Military Rev-
olution (after Roberts, 1956), which introduced new (costly) military technologies. While some
key innovations such as gunpowder and the star-shaped fortification spread earlier (in the 14th
and 15th centuries, respectively), Gennaioli and Voth (2015) determine the year 1650 as the turning
point after which differences in military expenditures start becoming crucial in determining the
outcomes of a battle. The authors derive a model in which threat of war only leads to increases in
state capacity when financial resources matter for the probability of winning a war.12
of minorities, dependence on natural resources as well as the distribution of economic and political power (Besley and
Persson, 2009). Other authors have argued that distance mattered for building up institutions, and that thus smaller
polities had an advantage when travel was still slow and costly (Stasavage, 2010).
11They also regard cohesiveness of institutions and stability of institutions as additional drivers.
12Another result of the model in the paper is that only cohesive countries will invest in state capacity, as building up
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In our second hypothesis, we test the general argument on war and fiscal capacity, and the
refined argument made by Gennaioli and Voth (2015):
Hypothesis 2a Threat of war increases the probability that a territory will fiscally centralize.
Hypothesis 2b Threat of war only increases the probability that a territory will fiscally centralize after the
Military Revolution (i.e. after 1650).
2.3 Effects of Fiscal Capacity
In the models discussed here, more investments into fiscal capacity always generate higher rev-
enues for the state, which are used to finance war, or – more generally – to finance investments
into public goods (for example in Besley and Persson, 2009). In addition, states that are able to
extract some part of their citizens’ incomes have incentives to foster economic growth by investing
into growth enhancing policies (in the spirit of Olson’s (1993) stationary bandit). This mechanism
is captured both in the theoretical (Besley and Persson, 2008) and in the empirical (Dincecco, 2015;
Dincecco and Katz, 2016; Dincecco and Prado, 2012) literature on fiscal capacity.13 This motivates
our third set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a Fiscally centralized territories invest more in military and administration.
Hypothesis 3b Fiscally centralized territories exhibit higher economic growth.
In theoretical frameworks higher spending on war increases the probability of winning war,
which means that rulers are able to remain in power (Besley and Persson, 2010); winning wars
is thus predicted to be associated with the survival of territories in our setting. Gennaioli and
Voth (2015) similarly predict that fiscal capacity leads to a higher probability to win wars after the
Military Revolution. They show empirically that large European states with more tax revenues
were more likely to win wars after the Military Revolution. To circumvent the problem that war
is endogenous, they instrument the threat of war for countries by wars in neighboring countries.
In Alesina and Spolaore (2005), there also is a positive relationship between wars and the size of
states, because a more bellicose environment is associated with higher incentives to form larger
states. We will study the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a Fiscally centralized states are less likely to vanish.
Hypothesis 4b Fiscally centralized states grow more in size.
state capacity is costly for divided countries. Thus cohesive countries survive, while divided countries disappear.
13To study the effect of fiscal capacity on economic growth empirically, these papers use the incidence of war or
war casualties in the past as an instrument for fiscal capacity. Conflict in the past is associated with higher economic
growth/more wealth today.
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Hypothesis 4c Fiscally centralized states are less likely to vanish and grow more, because they are more
successful at war.
Other effects of war that are discussed in the literature include the build-up of national identity
(Alesina et al., 2017; Mazumder, 2018), urbanization (Dincecco and Onorato, 2016), or the welfare
state in general (Dincecco, 2015).14
3 Historical Background
In this paper, we study the rise of fiscal capacity in the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), an assembly of
many different territories which existed from the 9th until the 19th century in Central Europe. It
was headed by an elected Emperor, who was never able to fully unite the different territories and
to create a centralized government. Instead, territories were ruled by local princes, who decided
on the administrative and fiscal organization of their lands.
In the early Middle Ages, there was only very little fiscal capacity in the territories of the HRE.
Local offices (so-called A¨mter) were in charge of revenue collection and spending of princes. Rev-
enues did not stem from taxes yet, instead they came from sources that were accessible even with-
out sophisticated levels of fiscal capacity: from estates, demesnes and forests, income from court
fees, as well as mine, salt and coin monopolies, and tariffs. The introduction of taxes began in the
13th century (Klein, 1974, p. 12-14). Initially, dues and taxes were mostly paid in-kind, because of
the lack of monetarization of the medieval economy. Princes did not have a steady court location,
and in-kind payments were extracted locally to provide for the prince and his court. This local col-
lection of non-monetary revenues continued until approximately the middle of the 15th century.
After that central cash offices (Kassen) were introduced.
An increasing number of feuds between territories, the increasing costs of holding court, and
a rise in the costs of war technology were among the factors that required princes to increase their
sources of revenues. As a consequence, the fiscal administration had to be modernized. As a first
step in many territories, fiscal matters were assigned to one person, the so-called Landrentmeister.15
14Our research focuses on a European context. The literature on state and fiscal capacity has also studied develop-
ment trajectories in other regions. Herbst (1990, 2014) aims to explain why African states are comparatively weak by
contrasting the history of European state formation to (the absence) of African state formation before colonialism. Land
abundance and the absence of external threats in Africa implied that there were no incentives for rulers to build up
fiscal capacity to finance wars, thus providing an explanation for the weakness of state power in African states today.
Depetris-Chauvin (2016) also suggests that there is a link between historical experiences and current state effectiveness
in Africa, as he argues that regions in Africa with a longer history of statehood are better able to preserve order and
experience less conflict today. Dincecco et al. (2018) study the link between conflict and fiscal capacity in the African
context and find that historical conflict in Africa is associated with higher fiscal capacity, but at the same time more
civil war. They suggest that a lack of social trust might explain why more historical warfare is not associated with more
favorable current outcomes in Africa in contrast to the European case. Ko et al. (2018) explain the political centralization
of China as a reaction to the presence of an external threat stemming from only one direction. In this case, having a
government with a large tax base that can provide military investments at the affected border is the optimal strategy.
15In the lower Rhine areas the role of a Landrentmeister existed already in the 14th century, but in general this position
only arose from the mid-15th century onward.
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The Landrentmeister was in charge of collecting and organizing revenues, but there was no formal
institution which he presided over. While initially most of these Landrentmeister were of noble
origin, over time there was a shift towards commoners with a professional and university-trained
background. In larger territories one or two writers supported him. One of the first tasks of
this basic, un-institutionalized financial “administration” was the inspection and auditing of local
offices.
The continuing centralization of territories’ administrations in the 15th and 16th century also
affected the organization of fiscal administrations. During this time, Court Councils (Hofra¨te), that
is informal groups of confidants, who aided rulers with making decisions, first emerged. Initially,
these councils were concernedwith all administrative areas, but quickly certain fields were handed
to newly established, specialized councils. This marked the beginning of the first Finance Coun-
cils, mostly called Chambers (Hofkammern or Rentkammern) (Klein, 1974, p. 16): centralized fiscal
institutions that continued to evolve over the following centuries. The Chamber was in charge
of all domains and their revenues, as well as revenues from dues, tariffs, and taxes, using these
revenues to make payments in the name of the prince. Eventually, the Chamber took on the role
of an economic institution which tried to secure old and promote new revenue sources. This insti-
tutional and geographical centralization of fiscal administration was only possible because taxes
were now paid in cash and princes had a constant residence. In general, smaller territories had
smaller chambers (Wakefield, 2009, p. 16-17); larger territories had several Financial Councilors,
smaller territories often just had one.
The exact form and time of introducing a Chamber varied across territories. The first territory
to centralize in our dataset is Wu¨rttemberg: in 1521, while under control of the Habsburg. The
concept of centralizing fiscal matters in a Chamber had already been introduced in some areas of
the Habsburg Empire at that time. After occupation ended, Wu¨rttemberg continued to uphold an
independent Chamber, which was the central cash office, and in charge of the prince’s domains
and local offices. In Bavaria, a Chamber was introduced in 1550. Before this, an assigned official
had administered all revenues, but there was no special office in charge of finances yet. After
1550 all spending and all financial matters had to go through the Chamber. Similarly, in Hesse the
financial administration was also already executed by assigned officials before the introduction of
a Chamber. The actual establishment of a Chamber followed in 1558, with the adoption of the first
Chamber ordinance (Kammerordnung). It specified that the Chamber was in charge of managing
the treasure, debts, the spending of the court on wages and food, as well as all princely properties
including the forests. In 1567, Hesse split up into two lineages, Hesse-Kassel andHesse-Darmstadt.
The former territory continued the Chamber, whereas in the latter there is only evidence for a
Chamber from the 1590s onwards.
Until the first half of the 18th century, a collegial organization of Chambers became the norm,
even though the exact organizational set-up differed across territories. Different departments run
by different Councilors within the Chamber were established with the aim of establishing depart-
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ments in charge of individual aspects of governing. The first areas where this happened were
trade and crafts. Over time, these newly established departments superseded the formerly all-
encompassing role of the Chambers (Willoweit, 1982, p. 330-347).
The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 also marks a turning point in the fiscal
history of German territories. In response to the Napoleonic Wars, the number of territories fell
rapidly and in 1815 the remaining 39 German states formed the German Confederation. Each
territory established its own finance ministry, which organized the relevant subordinated depart-
ments. There remained large differences in the fiscal capacity of states. For example, a universal
income tax, the hallmark of modern fiscal capacity, was introduced in 1834 in Hanover, but only in
1913 in Mecklenburg-Neustrelitz and Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The Principality of Waldeck never
introduced a universal income tax until it ceased to exist in 1918.
4 Data
Our analysis is based on a novel panel of 2,392 cities and their corresponding 707 territories from
1400 to 1800.16 Cities are taken from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch (Keyser et al., eds, 1939-2003), an en-
cyclopedic compendium containing all cities that existed in Germany in 1937. Their location and
border maps are taken from Bogucka et al. (2019). Figure 1 maps the location of these cities. We
complement this with information on the history of administrative entities based on an encyclope-
dia on German territories (Ko¨bler, 2007), a website listing lineage trees of the majority of German
and European noble families, a large number of historical maps, and sources on individual families
and territories (Cantoni et al., 2019).17
Each city is assigned to a territory in each year. The exact borders of territories in the Holy
Roman Empire are mostly unclear.18 To obtain an idea of the geographical extent of territories,
we thus estimate each territory’s likely area of influence through the number and location of cities
that were under its control, at any given point in time. We proxy borders by drawing polygons
around each city, and assigning each point in the Holy Roman Empire to its closest city, taking into
account territory ruggedness. The assignment is decided upon by modified Thiessen polygons
(Voronoi partitions).
Figure 2 shows a snapshot of the size and location of territories created in this way for each cen-
16We exclude the territory Bohemia from our analysis for two reasons: first, due to the location of Bohemian lands,
our dataset only captures a fraction of the kingdom, which extended far into the east. Thus, we cannot clearly infer
about its size and the changes thereof. Second, its ruling family, the Habsburg Dynasty, aggravates the issue further, as
their lands in Austria, Hungary, and Spain are also not covered in the data. No other territorial entity or ruling family is
so clearly peripheral in our data. We note that no results change fundamentally with Bohemia included into the analysis
(results available on request).
17For more information on the coding of the territories refer to Appendix A.1.
18The transition from the Middle Ages to the early modern era also marks the slow move from states based on feudal
relationships of dependence between individuals (Personenverbandsstaat) to the concept of a state as a geographic area
defined by spatial, not personal boundaries (Fla¨chenstaat). Thus it is difficult to apply modern concepts of borders to
previous eras, especially in earlier centuries (Mayer, 1956; Power, 1999; Schubert, 2006; Rutz, 2018).
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tury from 1400 to 1800. The number of territories in our dataset declines from 361 to 197 between
1400 and 1800. At the same time the surviving territories grow in size; while the average territory
we observe in 1400 had 85 cities, it had 245 in 1800 (the overall number of cities that we observe
in each year is constant).19 Using the Herfindahl index, which measures the concentration of cities
across territories, we find that the index increased by a factor of 3 between 1400 and 1800 (see Fig-
ure A.1 in the appendix). That is, while half of the territories were unsuccessful and disappeared,
the successfully remaining territories tripled their number of cities. By 1800 small territories still
existed, albeit in much lower numbers than 400 years earlier.
For each city, the St a¨dtebuch contains information on significant construction events at the
city level. We group construction events into different categories: administrative (courthouses,
town halls, ...), military (castles, arsenals, fortifications, ...), and economic construction (storages,
warehouses, manufactories, ...). There are around 16,000 construction events which we can date.
We supplement this with data on modern, star-shaped fortifications based on Schu¨tte (1984) and
Klo¨ffer (2004), and cross-check those withWikipedia and google maps satellite images. During the
Military Revolution several states built these fortifications, and we treat them as a prime example
of a costly military technology introduced by the Military Revolution.
The Sta¨dtebuchmoreover records attacks at the city level, which we consider a proxy for overall
war activity. We observe two main groups of attack events: those leading to physical destruction,
and attacks leading to a loss of money for the attacked party. It is not recorded from which territo-
ries these attacks originated, but in Table A.2 in the Appendix we provide evidence that attacks on
cities of territories occur at the same time as new cities enter these territories. It appears thus that
attacks on cities are part of a broader set of war activities, in which the territory under considera-
tion is attacked and at the same time also attacks other territories; in the remainder of the paper,
we interpret attacks as a proxy for overall military conflict.
To measure fiscal centralization, we collected a novel dataset on the timing of fiscal centraliza-
tion in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire. The dataset builds on a comprehensive handbook
on the history of administration in Germany (Jeserich et al., 1983). We supplement this with infor-
mation from a large number of publications on fiscal and regional histories. We find evidence for
fiscal centralization in 27 territories, which are presented in Figure 3.20 There is considerable varia-
tion in the timing of fiscal centralization: Wu¨rttemberg and Albertine Saxony were the first territo-
ries to centralize at the beginning of the 16th century, whereas the Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz,
the Prince-Bishopric of Augsburg, the Electorate of Trier, and the Prince-Bishopric of Paderborn
only centralize at the beginning of the 18th century. The number of cities within centralized terri-
tories increases as the number of centralized territories increases. When Wu¨rttemberg centralized
in 1521, 81 cities belonged to a centralized territory, by 1600 this had increased to 261 cities, and
19Median territory size increased from 32 to 90 in the same time span.
20Appendix Table A.1 summarizes the dates of fiscal centralization and type of institution that was introduced for
each territory, and lists selected sources.
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in 1723, when the last territory in our dataset, the Prince-Bishopric of Paderborn, introduced a
Chamber, there were 1,526 cities in centralized territories. Figure 4 illustrates the increase in the
area covered by centralized territories between 1500 and 1800. In 1500 no centralized territories
existed yet, but by 1600 already large parts of the area under consideration belonged to centralized
territories. By 1700 and 1800 this area had increased even further, incorporating even more space
especially in the Northern parts.21
5 Determinants of Fiscal Centralization
We first study the circumstances that are associated – albeit not necessarily in a causal way – with
the emergence of modern fiscal institutions. According to the literature on fiscal capacity, fiscal
centralization is driven by centralization in neighboring territories (Hypothesis 1) and an environ-
ment of bellicosity (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Centralized neighbors and threat of war increase the
need of territories for revenues to finance potential conflict. To meet these demands, territories
centralize. We estimate the following model to explore this relationship:
100× Centralizationjt = γ1CentralizedNeighborsjt
+ γ2CentralizedNeighborsjt × Post1650t
+ β1ThreatWarjt + β2ThreatWarjt × Post1650t
+ ζ1Controlsjt−1 + ζ1Controlsjt−1 × Post1650t
+ αj + αt + ǫit (1)
where Centralizationjt is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if territory j centralizes in year t,
and zero otherwise. To facilitate the readability of coefficients, we multiply this dummy with 100.
Once a territory centralizes, it does not lose this status. Since we are interested in territories cen-
tralizing instead of staying centralized, we drop territories from the sample after they centralize.
CentralizedNeighborsjt is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of cities from centralized
territories within a 50 km radius of j in t. Positive values of γ1 indicate that centralization of
21In our main analysis, we assume that territories have not been centralized if we have not found any evidence of the
existence of a chamber. It is possible that by doing so we are treating some territories which in fact were centralized
as non-centralized. If this wrong assignment is random, our estimates would be smaller in magnitude than the true
difference between centralized and non-centralized territories. If, one the other hand, we aremore likely to find evidence
on centralization for larger territories, and our outcome of interest (e.g., territorial size, or construction activity) is
generally higher in larger territories, our empirical analysis would be biased upwards. There are several reasons why
we believe that this is not the case here. First, the historical literature clearly states that centralization in the HRE started
in Wu¨rttemberg in 1521. Thus, it is very unlikely that we missed any events before 1521. Second, not all of our treated
territories are large and may encompass only a few cities in the dataset (for example Mu¨nster or Trier). Third, we have
found explicit evidence on fiscal centralization for some territories that have not been treated – and these are in fact
territories that ceased to exist. Last, there is a large regional history on German territories, which also focuses on small
territories. In addition, we address this issue in our empirical analysis by controlling for territory fixed effects, thus only
looking at the variation of outcomes within a territory after centralization was introduced.
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neighbors is related to the centralization of a territory, as claimed in Hypothesis 1.
To capture the threat of war, ThreatWar is measured in two ways: first, we use a dummy mea-
suring whether any cities in territory j were attacked in the current period or one or two decades
before, which proxies actual war activities. Second, we also turn to the stock of military construc-
tion by other territories within a 50 km radius of territory j as a measure for the risk of a potential
war, capturing how militarily exposed j is. The coefficient β1 tests Hypothesis 2a, i.e. whether
threat of war is associated with an increased probability to centralize.
CentralizedNeighbors and ThreatWar are both interactedwith Post1650, a dummy for all decades
after 1650. We follow Gennaioli and Voth (2015) who also use a dummy for the time after 1650 to
capture the onset of theMilitary Revolution, after which financial resources arguably becamemore
important to win wars. If Hypothesis 2b is true, and threat of war after the Military Revolution in-
creases the probability that a territory centralizes, β2 will be larger than zero. γ2 indicates whether
centralization of neighbors is associated with a different probability of centralization of a territory
after the Military Revolution.
Controlsjt−1 comprise the lagged natural logarithm of the number of cities in territory j. We
also interact this with Post1650 to allow the number of cities to have a different effect before and
after the onset of the Military Revolution. αj are territory fixed effects, and αt are decade fixed
effects. By including territory (time) fixed effects we are controlling for any territory (time) specific
factors that are constant over time (the same for all territories). This is important in our setting
if these factors are correlated with threat of war or centralization of neighbors and have an effect
on centralization themselves. One example of such an omitted variable is resource abundance:
territories that have access to more valuable resources, such as silver, might be attacked more
often by other territories, and at the same time they are richer and thus able to invest more money
in fiscal centralization. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
We use a linear probability model here to calculate the probability of centralization, following
the approach in Belloc et al. (2016). Using a linear probability model in this setting, as opposed to
a probit, logit or Cox duration model, allows us to include a wider range of fixed effects.
Results of estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 1. Before the onset of the Military
Revolution, a 1 percent increase in the number of cities of a centralized territory within a 50 km
radius is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in the probability of centralizing. After the Military
Revolution, there is no longer a statistically significant difference in the probability of centralizing
between territories with and without a centralized neighbor. This supports Hypothesis 1 with lim-
itations; having a centralized neighbor increases the probability of centralization, but only before
1650; after theMilitary Revolution, having a centralized neighbor no longer predicts centralization.
There are two potential explanations for this pattern. First, territories with a centralized neigh-
bor might be more likely to disappear, that is, they are more prone to being conquered by their
centralized neighboring territory. In this case, they cease to exist before they have a chance to
centralize. We examine the relationship between centralized neighbors and survival rates in the
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next section. A second possible explanation is that centralized territories no longer focus on solely
conquering their neighbors after the Military Revolution, but use novel military technologies to
conquer territories in all parts of the HRE. In this case the overall number of centralized territo-
ries instead of distance to a centralized territory matters for centralization. The overall number of
territories is the same for all territories and is thus captured by year fixed effects.
Attacks in the current and past two decades are positively related to centralization of a territory.
This effect does not change with the onset of the Military Revolution (columns 2 and 4). Looking at
the mere risk of war the same pattern emerges: an additional military building of another territory
that lies within a 50 km radius increases the probability of centralization by 0.8 to 1.5 percent both
before and after the Military Revolution (columns 3 and 5). This suggests that the so-called threat of
war, which forms the basis of manymodels, can be understood both as the threat of an existing war
or the threat of war occurring. With regard to our hypotheses the results suggest that conflict is
related to centralization (in line with Hypothesis 2a), but this effect does not arise with the advent
of the Military Revolution (contrasting Hypothesis 2b).
6 Effects of Fiscal Centralization
6.1 Local Investments
We now compare investment activity of centralized and non-centralized territories at the local
level. Hypothesis 3 postulates that fiscally centralized territories invest more in administration
and the military, and have higher rates of economic growth. We analyze investment activities at
the city level and proxy investment activity by physical construction. In particular, we examine
whether overall construction activity increases, and whether there is more administrative, military
and economic construction. We interpret overall construction as conveying information on invest-
ment activity in general, administrative construction on investments into state capacity, military
construction as investments into military, and economic construction as a proxy for economic ac-
tivity. Figure 5 presents aggregate construction patterns. Construction is increasing from 1400 to
around 1750 and is sensitive to large wars, e.g. during the Thirty Years’ War (1618 to 1648) and the
Seven Years’ War (1756 to 1763) there are sharp drops in overall construction.
We estimate the following model:
100× Constructionit =β1Centralizedj(i,t)t + ζControlsij(i,t)t + αi + αj(i,t) + αt + ǫit , (2)
where Construction is the number of construction events (of a certain kind) in city i in year t. At any
point in time, a city i is assigned to a territory j(i, t) For readability, we again multiply outcome
of interest by 100, thus values can be interpreted as construction per century. We differentiate
between overall construction, administrative construction, military construction, construction of
fortifications as a subgroup of military construction, and economic construction. Centralizedj(i,t)t
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is a dummy that takes value 1 if city i in a given year t belongs to a territory j(i, t) that is currently
centralized.
Based on the literature on fiscal capacity, we expect there to be an increase in administrative
and military construction (Hypothesis 3a), as well as in economic construction (Hypothesis 3b). In
this case, β1 will be positive. Controls account for the presence of a secondary ruler in a city in a
given year and for whether the territorial affiliation of a city is contested.
Moreover, we include a number of fixed effects: αi are city fixed effects, αj(i,t) territory fixed ef-
fects, and αt year fixed effects. We can identify city and territory fixed effects separately, as several
cities switch territories over time. By including these fixed effects, β1 measures how construction
within a city changes after it becomes part of a centralized territory, net of the effect of unobserved
factors that are constant over time for the city itself, for all cities in the same territory, and of time
patterns in construction that affect all cities equally. This takes into account that centralization
might occur during a time in which construction levels change in all cities equally, and controls for
aggregate construction decreasing during times of large scale wars. Standard errors are clustered
at the territory level.
Table 2 presents results. Overall construction at the city level increases by 0.411 events per
century after a territory centralizes; this effect is statistically significantly different from zero at the
5 percent level (column 1). This is around a third of the average construction in a city in a cen-
tury, which is 1.371 buildings. Centralization is also associated with an increase in administrative
buildings (0.068, significant at 5 percent, column 2), which indicates that there are investments into
state capacity, as suggested by hypothesis 3a. In addition, military construction increases by 0.039
(significant at 5 percent, column 3). This is an economically significant increase considering that on
average 0.051 additional military buildings are constructed per century in a city. However, cities
are not more likely to build fortifications, an extremely effective, but costlymilitary technology that
spread during the Military Revolution (column 4). Positive effects on overall military construction
support the claims of the war-state capacity literature as in Hypothesis 3a. There is no evidence
for a differential increase in investments into novel military technologies after centralization.
Hypothesis 3b states that centralized territories experience more economic growth. The rela-
tionship between centralization and economic construction, which we use as a proxy for commer-
cial expansion and plausibly economic growth, is presented in column 5. While the estimated
coefficient is similar in size to the coefficients for overall, administrative and military construction,
standard errors are larger for economic construction.
Do these increases occur equally within centralized territories? In Panel B we differentiate
between cities that were in a territory during the time of centralization, and cities that become
part of already centralized territories. We refer to cities that were part of a territory at the time
of centralization as the core, and to cities that became part of an already centralized territory as
periphery. A peripheral city is coded as centralized after it enters an already centralized territory.
We find that only core cities experience a statistically significant increase in aggregate con-
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struction of 0.464 buildings per century (significant at 1 percent level, column 1). Administrative
construction increases equally in core and peripheral cities after centralization, which indicates
that investments into administration in general, and fiscal capacity in particular, are made in all
areas of a territory, also in newly acquired regions (column 2). However, military construction
only increases in core cities of centralized territories (column 3). This finding contrasts with the
conceptualization of military investments as public goods, and of investments that are used to
fortify newly acquired territories. Since administrative investments are equal among core and pe-
ripheral cities, this difference cannot be due to a lack in the ability of the territory to enforce fiscal
capacity or to operationalize investments in peripheral cities. Finally, economic construction in-
creases by 0.043 (significant at 10 percent level) in core cities following fiscal centralization, but not
in peripheral cities (column 5).
Event study analysis To understand the relationship between centralization and local invest-






+ αj(i,t) + Controlsij(i,t)t + αi + αj(i,t) + αt + ǫit (3)
where Constructionit, Centralizedj(i,t)t, αi, αj(i,t) and αt are defined as above.
We interact centralization with a set of relative decade dummies for the decades before and
after centralization, where the dummy for the decade prior to centralization is omitted. We define
the dummy for τ = −5 such as to encompass all the periods 5 decades or more prior to the year
of centralization; analogously, for τ = 5 we include all time periods 5 decades or later, relative to
the year of centralization. Thus, we estimate construction in cities that will eventually centralize
for each decade relative to construction in the ten years before centralization.
We control for whether there is a secondary ruler and whether sovereignty over the city is
contested. We again include a full set of fixed effects: city fixed effects, αi, territory fixed effects,
αj(i,t), and year fixed effects, αt. Thus, βt compares construction levels in cities that centralize
to their construction levels during the decade before centralization after excluding all differences
that are due to city specific factors, territory specific factors or time specific factors that exist for all
territories.22 Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
Results are presented in Figure 6, and add more nuance to the results of Table 2. There is no
pre-trend in overall construction before centralization. Overall construction only starts to increase
in the first decade after centralization, and continues to increase further over the next decades
compared to construction levels in the decade before centralization. Before centralization, admin-
22In Appendix A.2, we show results of Regression 2 when we limit the analysis to all cities that will centralize eventu-
ally. Results are nearly identical, as expected with the inclusion of city fixed effects in both regressions. Omitting cities
that do not centralized will have an impact on the estimates of the time fixed effects.
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istrative construction also shows no pre-trends. After centralization occurs, administrative con-
struction jumps up, and remains on this higher level. Military construction is slightly lower in
the third decade before and slightly higher in the second decade before centralization compared
to the decade before centralization. After centralization, military construction in centralized cities
increases slowly but continuously over the decades. Turning to the construction of fortifications
specifically, one does not observe clear differences in trends after after centralization.
The pattern for economic construction appears less smooth than that for overall or administra-
tive construction. After centralization occurs, there is only evidence for a positive effect starting
50 years after centralization. The patterns thus add further support for Hypothesis 3a, i.e. that
fiscally centralized territories invest more in their administration and their military, as the positive
effects begin right after centralization was introduced. We conversely find no evidence strength-
ening Hypothesis 3b, which stated that centralized territories experience more economic growth,
at least not in the short run.
6.2 Warfare in Centralized Territories
We found that investments in military construction are higher in centralized cities that lie in the
core of centralized territories. Does this have an effect on war activities conducted by centralized
territories, as is commonly assumed in the literature? We estimate the following regression looking
at the number of attacks cities in centralized territories are subjected to:
100× Attacksit = β1Centralizedj(i,t)t + β2Centralizedj(i,t)t × Post1650t
+ αi + αj(i,t) + αt + ǫit (4)
where Attacksit is the number of attacks in a year in city i in year t. Again, wemultiply the outcome
variable times 100 for easier readability. Coefficients can thus be interpreted as the change in the
number of attacks occurring in a century. In further regressions, we differentiate between the
number of attacks that lead to physical destruction and the number of attacks that are associated
with monetary losses, for example because the city was looted, troops were billeted in it, or the city
made payments to hostile troops. This captures the cost of war for the local population. According
to the literature on fiscal capacity, people consent to paying taxes to protect themselves from the
negative impacts of war. By looking at the relationship between fiscal centralization and attacks
with costs for the local population, we assess the existence of this link in the Holy Roman Empire.
Centralizedj(i,t)t is a dummy that takes the value 1 if territory j(i, t) is centralized in year i. If
βˆ is larger than 0, cities in centralized territories are subject to more attacks, which we interpret
as indicative of territories’ involvement in more war overall. Post1650t is a dummy for all years
after 1650, and captures the period after the advent of the Military Revolution. In a second set of
regressions we differentiate between cities that were part of a centralized territory at the timing
of centralization and cities that become part of centralized territories after centralization, i.e. core
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and peripheral cities. αi are city, αj(i, t) territory, and αt time fixed effects. Including city and
territory fixed effects is important as attacks predict centralization. By including fixed effects we
only consider changes in the number of attacks, not the overall level, so that we allow for the
possibility that centralized territories might have experienced more attacks over the entire period
under consideration. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
Considering the entire time period from 1400 to 1800, the number of attacks on cities in cen-
tralized territories does not change (column 1, Panel A). Dividing the effect before and after the
Military Revolution, we find that cities in centralized territories experience 0.003 fewer attacks per
year (significant at 5 percent) compared to cities that are in non-centralized territories.
Next, in columns 4 to 6 of Panel A we focus on attacks that affected cities negatively. The num-
ber of attacks resulting in physical destruction is slightly higher in centralized cities before 1650,
but does not differ from the number of attacks resulting in physical destruction in non-centralized
cities after 1650 (column 4). Cities in centralized territories experience fewer attacks that lead to
a loss of money after the Military Revolution (column 6). After the Military Revolution, when
military investments arguably become central to success in war, increased military investments of
cities in centralized territories are effective in reducing overall attacks, and as a result they also
experience fewer attacks that lead to monetary losses for the local population. This adds evidence
in line with the argument put forward in the literature about the incentives of citizens to accept the
introduction of fiscal institutions.
In Panel B we explore the implication of regional inequalities in military investments between
cities in the core and in the periphery of territories. Column 2 shows that decreases in the number
of attacks only occur in core cities – and only after 1650. Peripheral cities, where military invest-
ments did not increase after they become part of centralized territories, do not experience a drop
in the number of attacks in general (columns 1 and 2) or the number of costly attacks (columns 3
to 6) either before or after the Military Revolution.
6.3 Vanishing of Territories
Does the ability of centralized territories to financemoremilitary investments translate into a lower
probability of vanishing, as stated in Hypothesis 4a? We estimate the following OLS model to
examine the relationship between fiscal centralization, and the disappearance of territories:
100×Vanishjt = β1Centralizedjt + β2Centralizedjt × Post1650t
+ ζControlsjt + αt + ǫit (5)
where Vanishjt is a variable that takes on the value 1 if territory j vanishes, multiplied by 100
for readability. In further refined regressions we look at various potential reasons for vanishing,
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such as conflict and extinction of the ruling family.23 After a territory vanishes, it is dropped
from the sample. Centralizedjt is a dummy for centralized territories.
24Post1650 is a dummy for
all years after 1650, used to test whether centralization affects territorial survival differently after
the Military Revolution. Controlsjt are the lagged natural logarithm of the number of cities and a
dummy for the existence of any centralized territories within a 50 km radius, and whether there
was an attack on the territory in the current period or the period before. We interact all controls
with a dummy for all years post 1650. αt are year fixed effects that capture shocks that are common
for all territories. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
Table 4 looks at the relationship between a territory’s likelihood of vanishing and centraliza-
tion. Centralized territories are 0.401 percentage points less likely to cease to exist in a given year
(column 1), which is a very large effect considering that the baseline probability of vanishing is
0.444 percentage points each year. Controlling for the existence of centralized neighbors and at-
tacks, the effect decreases slightly (0.378, column 2). This supports Hypothesis 4a, i.e. centralized
territories are less likely to vanish. In addition, we are able to uncover a number of interesting
patterns about the nature of vanishing of territories. The existence of centralized neighbors has
no effect on the general probability of vanishing before or after the Military Revolution. Being
attacked increases the probability of vanishing after 1650, indicating that the novel technologies in
warfare introduced during theMilitary Revolution increase the ultimate cost of war for sovereigns:
warfare can lead to extinction.
Turning to different reasons for vanishing, we find that centralized territories are around 0.05
percentage points less likely to vanish because of conflict, a sizable effect compared to a baseline
probability of vanishing because of a conflict of 0.03 percent (see columns 3 and 4). This is in
line with the common interpretation in the literature, where centralization makes territories more
successful in (potential) conflicts (either by increasing the probability to win, or by discouraging
other territories from engaging in conflict in the first place, as suggested in Table 3).
Moreover, having a centralized neighbor increases the probability that a territory vanishes be-
cause of conflict, and this probability increases even further after the Military Revolution. This
provides a possible explanation as to why Table 1 shows that territories are no longer more likely
to centralize if they have a centralized neighbor after the Military Revolution: while having a
centralized neighbor increases the incentives to centralize to be able to compete militarily against
centralized neighbors, it also increases the probability that they vanish because centralized neigh-
boring territories attack them. Centralization is also associated with a decrease in the probability of
vanishing because of extinction of the ruling family, holding the number of attacks on cities within
the territory constant (0.45 to 0.54 percentage points lower probability, columns 5 and 6) compared
23A territory is coded as vanishing due to conflict or extinction if the territory loses at least one city in the year they
vanish due to the respective reason. Results are robust to limiting the analysis to cases in which at least 50 percent of all
lost cities are lost due to the respective reason.
24It should be acknowledged at this point that there are territories which centralize and still vanish. One example is
Brunswick-Lu¨neburg, which centralizes in 1616 and vanishes due to lineage extinction in 1705.
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to a baseline probability of 0.18 percent.
Overall the results in Table 4 provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that centralization
decreases the probability that a territory ceases to exist because they are more successful at warfare
(Hypothesis 4c).
6.4 Territorial Expansion
Finally, we aim to examine whether centralized territories grow in size after they centralize, as
claimed in hypothesis 4b. To test this, we estimate the following regression:
NumberCitiesjt = β1Centralizedjt + β2Centralizedjt ×YearsCentralizedjt
+ γ1Attacksjt + γ2Attacksjt × Post1650t
+ αj + αt + ǫjt, (6)
where NumberCitiesjt is the number (or natural logarithm) of cities that belong to territory j in
year t. In separate regressions, we either use all cities and uncontested cities (results in Table 5
in main text), or contested cities and cities with only a single ruler (results in Table A.3 in the
Appendix). Uncontested cities are cities over which a territory claims sovereignty without this
claim being challenged by other territories, whereas for contested cities this claim is challenged.
Cities with a single ruler are cities without a second, less powerful claimant of the city. An increase
in the number of uncontested cities thus measures the increase in the size of territories that is not
disputed by other territories, and offers a measure of an increase in factual control over a region.
Centralizedjt is a dummy indicatingwhether territory jwas centralized in year t,YearsCentralizedjt
is the number of years territory j has been centralized. We include this term to allow the effect of
centralization on size to grow (or fall) over the duration of centralization. To see whether the po-
tential relationship between centralization and size of territories is driven by attacks, we control
for Attacksjt, the number of attacks in the current period. We interact this with Post1650t to allow
attacks to differently affect territory size before and after the Military Revolution. αj and αt are
territory and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
Results are presented in Table 5. Territories are larger after they centralize, holding territory
and time fixed effects constant. Centralized territories on average hold 17 additional cities (signif-
icant at 10 percent) after centralization or around 23 percent (significant at 5 percent) more cities
(column 1 in Panels A and B respectively). This increase in size occurs over time (column 2). A
centralized territory grows by one city every five years (column 2, Panel A) or by 1 percent every
ten years (column 2, Panel B). Controlling for the number of attacks on cities within the territory
in the current decade does not have an effect on these coefficients. Attacks, which we interpret as
proxying for war activities in general, are associated with an increase in territory size by around 1.4
cities (column 3, Panel A). Centralized territories grow by gaining uncontested sovereignty over
cities: in columns 4 to 6 we only look at the number of cities uncontested by claims of sovereignty
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through other territories. The coefficients are nearly identical to those in previous columns.
To understand the reasons for the increase in the size of centralized territories, we calculate the
number of cities that enter and leave centralized territories compared to non-centralized territories
using equation (6). Results are summarized in Table 6. Centralized territories do not gain or lose
more cities overall compared to non-centralized cities (columns 1 and 4). There is also no relation-
ship between centralization and gaining (losing) cities due to conflict (column 2 and 4). Territories
that are engaged in war activities are more likely to gain or lose cities via conflict (columns 2 and 4
in Panel B).
How can we reconcile the finding that centralized territories are larger than non-centralized
territories, but at the same time they do not gain more or lose less cities than non-centralized
territories, ceteris paribus? All territories grow over time, and centralized territories exist longer,
as they are less likely to vanish (see Table 4). Centralized territories thus have the opportunity to
grow larger because they grow over a longer period of time, not because they grow at a faster rate
than non-centralized territories.
7 Conclusion
The emergence of fiscal administrations that are able to levy and collect taxes are an important
part of modern state formation (Weber, 1919; Tilly, 1975). In this paper, we document the history
of fiscal capacity and how it links to the survival of territories in the Holy Roman Empire and
analyze the causes and effects of the introduction of the first institutionalized and centralized fiscal
organization, the Chamber.
We show that territories that are exposed to more incentives to centralize – either because
neighboring territories are already centralized or because threat of war is higher – are more likely
to introduce a Chamber. This confirms Tilly (1975) influential argument that wars led to the for-
mation of states with fiscal administrations.
We then consider the consequences of fiscal centralization, and show that centralized territo-
ries are less likely to vanish, and are thus able to become larger than non-centralized territories.
Centralized territories invest more in their administration and in their military. However, military
investments do not occur equally across the territory: increases in investments only occur in those
cities that were already part of the territory at the time it centralized (core territory), not in cities
that enter the territory later (peripheral territory).
This has important implications for the way we should think about fiscal centralization. In
theoretical models citizens agree to have fiscal centralization because they expect taxes to be spent
on a public good, and thus to profit from them. We find evidence for this in the Holy Roman
Empire. However, we add that there is a second important layer: after centralization was intro-
duced, it increases the level of fiscal capacity in the entire territory. Cities that become part of an
already centralized territory do not enter a bargain with the sovereign on whether fiscal central-
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ization should be introduced, and are thus not offered any “rewards”, and consequently see no
increase in military investments. Centralization can thus have large effects on inequality within
territories. Higher military investments in the core of territories decreases their exposure to war
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Cities in our Dataset within 1937 Borders
Note Each dot represents the location of one city in our dataset within the borders of Germany of 1937. Data sources:
see text
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Figure 2: Territories in the Holy Roman Empire
Note The figure shows territorial borders for the years 1400, 1500, 1600, 1700, 1800, and 1815 within German borders of
1937. To map territories, we first calculate a Thiessen polygon around each city, taking into account terrain ruggedness.
Next, we aggregate all cities and “their” surrounding Thiessen polygons that belong to the same territory in a given
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Figure 3: Number of Centralized Cities and Dates of Centralization
Note The figure shows the number of cities that belong to centralized territories in each year. Dots represent the year of the introduction of a Chamber in a
Protestant territory, triangles the introduction of a Chamber in a Catholic territory. Data sources: see text and Appendix A.1
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Figure 4: Centralized Territories in the Holy Roman Empire
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Figure 5: Aggregate Construction over Time
Note This figure shows aggregate construction over time. The gray line presents the raw numbers, the black line
construction patterns based on a moving 3 year average. The two vertical lines mark the outset of the 30 Years’ War
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Figure 6: Differences in Construction over Time




Table 1: Predicting Centralization
Centralized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Centralized Neighbors 2.432*** 2.365*** 2.043***
(0.678) (0.671) (0.648)
ln Centralized Neighbors -3.130*** -3.192*** -2.930***
× Post1650 (0.891) (0.900) (0.952)
Attack current decade 3.576*** 3.443***
(1.094) (1.065)
Attack, one decade before 2.076** 2.007**
(0.864) (0.845)
Attack, two decades before 1.392* 1.268*
(0.777) (0.758)
Attack current decade -1.612 -1.433
× Post1650 (2.150) (2.139)
Attack, one decade before 0.412 0.520
× Post1650 (1.965) (1.957)
Attack, two decades before 2.045 2.208
× Post1650 (2.091) (2.090)
ln Military Neighbors 2.835*** 1.874**
(0.936) (0.873)
ln Military Neighbors -2.625* -1.215
× Post1650 (1.475) (1.561)
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.421 0.436 0.419 0.441 0.423
Observations 108,771 96,517 108,771 96,517 108,771
Note Table shows results of Regression 1. The individual unit of observation is a territory. The dependent variable,
an indicator of centralization of a given territory, is multiplied by 100 for coefficient readability. Controls are the nat-
ural logarithm of the number of cities in a given territory and the natural logarithm of the number of cities that be-
long to a territory times a dummy for post 1650. Standard errors are clustered at territory level. *, **, and *** denote
significance on the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2: Construction in Cities
Construction
All Admin Military Fortification Economic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Cities
Centralized 0.363*** 0.056** 0.041*** 0.006 0.040*
(0.130) (0.026) (0.014) (0.010) (0.022)
R-squared 0.026 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.007
Panel B: Core vs Peripheral Cities
Centralized, core 0.390*** 0.056** 0.043*** 0.006 0.040*
(0.131) (0.027) (0.014) (0.011) (0.022)
Centralized, periphery -0.017 0.065** 0.003 0.011 0.038
(0.153) (0.032) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024)
R-squared 0.027 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.007
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
City FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Territory FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mean dep. var 1.371 0.205 0.051 0.024 0.065
Observations 889,443 889,443 889,443 889,443 889,443
Note Results of Regression 2. The individual unit of observation is a city. The dependent variable, the number of
construction events in a given city in a given year, is multiplied by 100 for coefficient readability. Controls are a
dummy indicating whether a city has a secondary ruler and a dummy for whether the territorial affiliation of a city
is contested. Standard errors are clustered at territory level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per
cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 3: Centralization and Attacks on Cities
Attacks
Number With physical destruction With loss of money
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All cities
Centralized 0.038 0.164 0.040 0.079* -0.003 0.075
(0.087) (0.119) (0.028) (0.042) (0.060) (0.081)
Centralized × Post 1650 -0.304** -0.095* -0.187**
(0.148) (0.052) (0.084)
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.023
Panel B: Differentiating between core and new cities
Centralized core cities 0.045 0.240* 0.043 0.086* 0.004 0.123
(0.089) (0.141) (0.028) (0.046) (0.061) (0.097)
Centralized core cities × Post 1650 -0.421** -0.101* -0.257**
(0.168) (0.059) (0.104)
Centralized peripheral cities -0.068 -0.355 -0.001 0.017 -0.095 -0.268
(0.114) (0.403) (0.034) (0.093) (0.076) (0.239)
Centralized peripheral cities × Post 1650 0.249 -0.060 0.150
(0.450) (0.105) (0.260)
City FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Territory FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.023
Observations 889,443 889,443 889,443 889,443 889,443 889,443
Note Results of Regression 4. Standard errors clustered at city level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and
1 percent level, respectively. Data sources: see text
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Table 4: Probability of Vanishing
Vanishing
All Due to Conflict Due to Extinction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Centralized -0.412*** -0.397*** -0.049** -0.052** -0.446*** -0.545***
(0.112) (0.103) (0.023) (0.024) (0.104) (0.084)
Centralized × Post 1650 -0.184 -0.048 0.047 0.094** -0.009 0.145
(0.176) (0.177) (0.035) (0.048) (0.144) (0.136)
Centralized Neighbors 0.106 0.010 0.091*
(0.089) (0.016) (0.052)
Centralized Neighbors × Post 1650 0.127 0.029 0.078
(0.116) (0.033) (0.064)
Attack 0.293*** -0.016 0.024
(0.105) (0.018) (0.062)
Attack × Post 1650 0.025 0.170* -0.048
(0.209) (0.092) (0.124)
Attack one decade before -0.152 0.008 0.151
(0.186) (0.026) (0.153)
Attack one decade before × Post 1650 -0.283 -0.152* -0.270
(0.260) (0.087) (0.196)
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004
Mean dep. Var 0.441 0.441 0.030 0.030 0.193 0.193
Observations 109,290 109,290 109,290 109,290 109,290 109,290
Note Table presents results of 5. Controls are the natural logarithm of the number of cities, and the interaction natural logarithm of the
number of cities with Post 1650. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per
cent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Data sources: see text
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Table 5: Territory Size
Cities
All Uncontested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Number Cities
Centralized 16.570* -3.819 -3.883 16.434* -4.328 -4.385
(8.974) (3.624) (3.571) (8.907) (3.601) (3.549)
Centralized × Years Centralized 0.226* 0.220* 0.230* 0.224*
(0.123) (0.116) (0.122) (0.115)
Attack, this decade 1.516* 1.414*
(0.794) (0.786)
Attack, this decade × Post 1650 2.258 2.406
(3.202) (3.164)
R-squared 0.824 0.837 0.838 0.823 0.836 0.837
Panel B: Natural logarithm of Cities
Centralized 0.284*** 0.160 0.158 0.270** 0.122 0.121
(0.105) (0.102) (0.104) (0.106) (0.107) (0.109)
Centralized × Years Centralized 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Attack, this decade 0.031 0.031
(0.027) (0.028)
Attack, this decade × Post 1650 0.006 0.016
(0.032) (0.032)
R-squared 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.943 0.943 0.944
Territory FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 108,771 108,771 108,771 108,771 108,771 108,771
Note Table presents results of Regression 6. Standard errors are clustered at territory level. *, **, and *** denote significance
on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively. Data sources: see text
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Table 6: Gains and Losses of Cities
Cities gained Cities lost
All Via Conflict Purchased All Via Conflict Sold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Cities gained and lost: Baseline
Centralized 5.645 3.270 -1.583 -4.034 -0.706 -0.446
(5.967) (5.496) (2.155) (6.630) (1.951) (0.284)
Centralized × Years Centralized -0.00743 0.0167 0.0142 -0.0474 0.00254 -0.00538***
(0.0645) (0.0734) (0.0292) (0.0300) (0.00919) (0.00161)
R-squared 0.034 0.022 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.018
Panel B: Cities gained and lost: Controlling for Warfare
Centralized 5.508 3.201 -1.564 -4.442 -0.798 -0.464
(5.939) (5.463) (2.161) (6.630) (1.974) (0.292)
Centralized × Years Centralized -0.00520 0.0142 0.0161 -0.0377 0.00391 -0.00503***
(0.0625) (0.0669) (0.0317) (0.0274) (0.00967) (0.00151)
Attack, this decade 2.890* 1.825 -0.645 8.330** 1.960* 0.374
(1.545) (1.109) (0.394) (3.341) (1.030) (0.334)
Attack, this decade × Post 1650 -1.253 1.023 -0.838 -5.155 -0.782 -0.193
(1.709) (3.127) (1.217) (3.185) (1.042) (0.436)
R-squared 0.034 0.022 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.018
Observations 108,771 108,771 108,771 108,771 108,771 108,771
Note Table presents results of Regression 6, with the number of cities gained (columns 1 to 3) or the number of cities lost (columns 4 to 6) as
a dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and
1 percent level, respectively. Data sources: see text
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Appendix A Appendix
A.1 Explanation of the Coding Process of Territories
Coding the history of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) entails coding the history of its ruling fami-
lies. Under loose regency of the Emperor, countless territorial entities existed, some large (Fu¨rsten-
und Herzogtu¨mer), some small (Graf- und Herrschaften). We aim to assign every entity a unique
ID and track its territorial holdings using said ID. A correct dataset thus depends on identifying
ruling units, and identifying their respective territories.
One can roughly distinguish two types of territories and thus rulers: ecclesiastical and secular.
We understand the largely stable ecclesiastical states under clerical rule as one entity throughout
their existence. Secular territories, however, were continuously broken up, re-structured, and uni-
fied as their rulers changed. These dynamics were often determined by familial structure: Inheri-
tances defined succession, warring siblings or heirs split territories, and marriages proved pivotal
when no direct male heir was in a lineage. Understanding and consistently coding this history thus
entails a full understanding of the relevant noble families. For this reason, we combine territorial
information with lineage information.
Regularly, sons inherited their father’s possessions. This could in principle take onmany forms:
sons sometimes ruled jointly, split the territory between them, or chose a unique successor. Most
commonly adapted was the Primogenitur; here, the oldest son inherited all possessions from his
father. The Golden Bull of 1356 instituted the Primogenitur in all electorate territories of the Holy
Roman Empire, and other minor territories followed suit. Succession became more intricate when
a ruler died without eligible (i.e. male) heirs. While surrounding rulers might have tried to bolster
an inheritance claim through strategic marriage, or negotiating a contract to this effect, there were
often multiple claims, causing dispute and sometimes war.
We trace lineages (that is, a string of male rulers in one family) throughout their existence by
assigning a unique individual code. If a lineage dies out, its Territory ID vanishes with it. In the
occasion of a split inheritance between siblings, we attest that there is always one favourable part
of the territory. The sibling who inherits the favourable territory inherits the lineage dummy. For
the newly founded lineage, a new code is established. Free cities and ecclesiastical territories are
assigned one code throughout their history.
To record the territorial holdings, cities are then assigned to their respective rulers as expressed
through the lineage codes. For every change, we record its specific reason. If a city is outside the
Holy Roman Empire in a given period, we record the state it belongs to, and the family ruling the
state, adhering to the rules stated above.
The rule structure of many cities was in reality multi-layered: one family could own estates
but enfeoff others, for example. To account for this, we trace secondary in addition to primary
rulers, conscious that we will not be able to depict actual power relations accurately. We include
secondary rulers as robustness checks and for extended analyses.
A.1
Finally, we adjust the territorial dataset to fit the specific application regarding fiscal central-
ization of states. In order to accurately depict treatment, we “stitch together” states where a ruling
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Figure A.1: Number of Territories and Concentration of Cities
Note Left axis shows number of territories, right axis the Herfindahl Index that measures the concentration of cities
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Figure A.2: Time Patterns of Construction, Intensive Margin
Note Results of regression 3 limiting the sample to cities that will at some point be part of a centralized territory with
95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at territory level. Data sources: see text
A.4
A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Centralized Territories and Dates of Centralization
Territory Year Name Selected Sources
Albertine Saxony 1524 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 816)
Prince-Bishopric of
Augsburg
1718 Hofkammer Wu¨st (1987, p.39)
Margraviate of
Baden-Baden
1588 Rentkammer Taddey (2000, p. 168)
Carlebach (1906, p. 43)
Margraviate of
Baden-Durlach
1578 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 630),
Taddey (2000, p. 168)
Prince-Bishopric of
Bamberg
1638 Hofkammer Weiß (2010)
Duchy of Bavaria 1550 Hofkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 581)
Margraviate Brandenburg 1577 Amtskammer Schultze (2004, p. 142-3)
Brunswick-Calenberg 1680 Kammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 754)
Brunswick-Lu¨neburg 1616 Kammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 753)
Brunswick-Wolfenbu¨ttel 1636 Kammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 752)
Electorate Cologne 1587 Hofkammer Wu¨st (1987, p. 37)
Bishopric of Eichsta¨tt 1651 Hofkammer (Braun, 1991, p. 94)
Landgraviate of
Hesse-Darmstadt
1595 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 648)
Landgraviate of
Hesse-Kassel
1558 Rentkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 648)
Duchy of Ju¨lich-Berg 1547 Rechenkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 708)
Duchy of Cleve Mark 1557 Rechenkammer Schottmu¨ller (1896, p. 66)
Electoral Palatinate 1557 Rechenkammer Press (1970, p. 99-100)
Electorate of Mainz 1532 Hofkammer Wu¨st (1987, p.37)
Duchy of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin
1659 Kammer Hamann (1965, p. 83)
Duchy of
Mecklenburg-Strelitz
1701 Kammer Hamann (1965, p. 99)
Prince-Bishopric of
Mu¨nster
1573 Rechenkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 732)
Prince-Bishopric of
Paderborn
1723 Hofkammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 735)
Ernestine Saxony 1633 Kammer Jeserich et al. (1983, p. 853)





Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg 1521 Rentkammer Bernhardt (1971, p. 32-3)
Bishopric of Wu¨rzburg 1553 Kammer Reuschling (1984, p. 232-4)
A.5
Table A.2: Attacks on Territories and Gains and Losses of Cities
Gains Losses
Number ln Number ln
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline
Attack 69.767** 0.103*** 4.036 0.053**
(31.913) (0.028) (35.608) (0.026)
Observations 17,979 17,979 17,979 17,979
R-squared 0.310 0.310 0.156 0.250
Panel B: Controlling for past attacks
Attack 47.877 0.074*** 3.321 0.044
(37.821) (0.028) (43.866) (0.029)
Attack, one year before 30.748 0.031 126.810*** 0.116***
(43.810) (0.027) (32.947) (0.026)
Attack, two years before -23.100 -0.011 -65.129 -0.057*
(23.728) (0.019) (49.777) (0.029)
Attack, three years before 10.675 -0.001 -24.768 -0.030
(31.979) (0.024) (46.290) (0.026)
Attack, four years before 8.000 -0.000 52.226* 0.043
(19.618) (0.020) (27.828) (0.026)
Attack, five years before 17.785 0.024 111.390*** 0.050
(28.742) (0.027) (40.733) (0.031)
Observations 12,622 12,622 12,622 12,622
R-squared 0.243 0.317 0.143 0.268
Note Column 1 and 3 look at the absolute number of gains/losses, column 2 and 4 at the natu-
ral logarithm of 1 plus the number of gains/losses. Standard errors are clustered at the terrtitory
level. *, **, and *** denote significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respec-
tively.
A.6
Table A.3: Territory Size
Cities
Contested Single Rule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Number Cities
Centralized 0.136 0.509* 0.502* 17.531** -2.017 -2.048
(0.186) (0.259) (0.258) (8.270) (3.186) (3.147)
Centralized × Years Centralized -0.004* -0.004 0.216** 0.211**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.109) (0.103)
Attack, this decade 0.102** 0.922*
(0.047) (0.530)
Attack, this decade × Post 1650 -0.148 2.505
(0.094) (2.794)
R-squared 0.470 0.472 0.473 0.805 0.821 0.822
Panel B: Natural logarithm of Cities
Centralized 0.004 0.055 0.054 0.327*** 0.173* 0.172*
(0.077) (0.071) (0.071) (0.102) (0.099) (0.100)
Centralized × Years Centralized -0.001 -0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Attack, this decade 0.019 0.023
(0.013) (0.025)
Attack, this decade × Post 1650 -0.015 0.019
(0.026) (0.032)
Territory FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.938 0.939 0.939
Observations 109,487 109,487 109,487 109,487 109,487 109,487
Note Results of Regression 6 using the number of contested cities (columns 1 to 3) and the number of cities with
a single ruler (columns 4 to 6) as an outcome. Standard errors are clustered at territory level. *, **, and *** denote
significance on the 10 percent, 5 per cent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
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